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Abstract
Concentration measures order the statistical units under observation according to their
market share. However, there are situations where an order according to an exogenous
variable is more appropriate or even required. The present article introduces a gen-
eralized definition of market concentration and defines a corresponding concentration
measure. It is shown that this generalized concept of market concentration satisfies
the common axioms of (classical) concentration measures. In an application example,
the proposed approach is compared with classical concentration measures; the data
are transfer spendings of German Bundesliga soccer teams, the “obvious” exogenous
order of the teams is the league ranking.
Keywords Market concentration, Concentration measure, Exogenous order, German
Bundesliga.
1 Introduction
Market concentration is a concept
“[...] which measures the relative position of large enterprises in the pro-
vision of specific goods or services [...]”,
as defined by the Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law
(OECD, 1993). It is a prevalent but highly discussed concept; many attempts have
been made to define sound measures of concentration (prominent publications are Hall
and Tideman, 1967; Hannah and Kay, 1977; Encaoua and Jacquemin, 1980).
An interesting aspect of the given definition—and of all similar definitions available
in the literature—is the term “large enterprises”. Well-established concentration mea-
sures like the concentration ratio and the Herfindahl index interpret “large” in terms
of the “specific goods”. In detail, the measures are computed on the enterprises or-
dered according to their market share. From the economics point of view this modus
operandi has nice properties; Saving (1970), for example, shows the relation between
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the Lerner measure of the degree of monopoly and concentration ratios expressed by
the market share of the g largest enterprises.
However, in this paper we present a different interpretation of “large enterprises”.
In fact, we generalize the definition of market concentration and allow an order of
the enterprises according to an exogenous variable. This exogenous order can be de-
fined by any property of the enterprises—for example, the number of employees, a
rating agency’s ranking, the geographical position from south to north, or the enter-
prises’ environmental dues. We introduce an appropriate concentration measure and
show that this concentration measure satisfies the conventional axiomatic of (classical)
concentration measures.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the formalism of classical
concentration measures and show common representatives. In Section 3 we introduce
the concentration measure for data with an exogenous order. Following the introduced
formalism we define a specific concentration rate, concentration curve and concentra-
tion index. Furthermore, we discuss its axiomatic (the formal proofs are available in
the Appendix A.2). In Section 4 we present an illustrative application. We investi-
gate the transfer spendings among the soccer teams of the German Bundesliga for the
seasons 1992/1993 to 2009/2010. The “obvious” exogenous order of the teams is their
league ranking at the end of each season. Finally, in Section 5 the conclusions are
given. All data sets and source codes for replicating our analyses are freely available
(see Appendix A.1 on computational details).
2 Concentration measures
In this section we review the formalism of classical concentration measures and show
common representatives. Given 1, . . . , n statistical units (e.g., enterprises), let X be
a specific characteristic of the statistical units (e.g., market share) and x1, . . . , xn
positive realizations (observations). The increasing order or decreasing order of the
observations is denoted by
0 ≤ x(1) ≤ x(2) ≤ . . . ≤ x(n)
and
x(1) ≥ x(2) ≥ . . . ≥ x(n) ≥ 0,
respectively (with
∑n
i=1 xi > 0). The corresponding ordered relative sums of observa-
tions then are defined by
pi :=
x(i)
n∑
j=1
xj
and ci :=
x(i)
n∑
j=1
xj
.
The vectors pT = (p1, . . . , pn) and c
T = (c1, . . . , cn) represent the corresponding suc-
cessive sums for i = 1, . . . , n. Using this formalism, we are able to define common
measures of concentration; we present three representatives which we use in the ap-
plication example (Section 4).
Concentration ratio. The concentration ratio is defined as
CRg :=
n∑
i=n−g+1
pi =
g∑
i=1
ci,
2
and yields values in [0, 1]. Concentration ratios show the extend of control of the
g largest statistical objects. In terms of our application example, the concentration
ratio explains the extent of control of a group of soccer teams with the g highest
transfer spendings in the league, illustrating the degree of dominance. Based on the
concentration ratios, the inequality can be visualized by the concentration curve (see,
e.g., Wagstaff et al., 1991).
Herfindahl index. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (Hirschman, 1964) is defined
as
H :=
n∑
i=1
p2i =
n∑
i=1
c2i ,
and results in values 1
n
≤ H ≤ 1. H is an indicator of the amount of competition among
the statistical units, i.e., represents the degree of concentration. In our application
example, it can be used as an indicator whether there is a monopoly or a significant
competition on the transfer spendings.
Rosenbluth Index. The Rosenbluth index (Rosenbluth, 1955, 1957) is defined as
RB :=
1
2
n∑
i=1
i ci − 1
=
1
2A
,
with
A =
n∑
i=1
i ci − 1
2
and
1
2
≤ A ≤ n
2
,
and results in values 1
n
≤ RB ≤ 1. RB denotes the area above the concentration
curve. It constitutes an alternative measure to investigate the absolute concentration
of a particular group of statistical units based on the kurtosis of the concentration
curve.
For both Herfindahl and Rosenbluth index, normalized versions are available:
H∗ := (H− 1
n
)/(1− 1
n
)
and
RB∗ := (RB− 1
n
)/(1− 1
n
),
with 0 ≤ H∗ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ RB∗ ≤ 1. Furthermore, the measures’ inverse, nH = 1/H
and nRB = 1/RB, are of interest as well—they can be interpreted as the “equivalent
number of equal sized units”.
Other well-known measures of concentration within this formalism are the Lorenz
curve, the Gini coefficient, the Entropy (Shannon, 1948) and the Exponential index
(for all see, e.g., Curry and George, 1983).
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Figure 1: Illustration of a concentration curve for data with an exogenous order.
3 Concentration measure for data with an exoge-
nous order
Following the formalism introduced in the previous section we define a concentration
measure based on the concentration rate CRg for data with an exogenous order. Given
the data x1, . . . , xn, their order based on an exogenous variable is denoted by
x[1], x[2], . . . , x[n].
Analogously, we assume
∑n
i=1 xi > 0 and define the ordered relative sum of statistical
units with respect to the exogenous order:
qi :=
x[i]
n∑
j=1
xj
.
The vector qT = (q1, . . . , qn) represents the corresponding successive sums for i =
1, . . . , n.
Concentration ratio. In analogy to the concentration ratio CRg we define the
exogenously ordered concentration rate; characterizing which part of the sum of objects
lies on the group x[1], . . . , x[g]. We define
ORg :=
g∑
i=1
qi,
with values in [0, 1]. ORg explains the proportion of the first g statistical units on the
overall sum with respect to the exogenous order. In terms of the application example
g = 3 and g = 9 are of special interest: OR3 is the concentration ratio of trans-
fer spendings of the teams competing for the qualification of the UEFA Champions
League; and OR9 is the concentration of the better half of the league.
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Concentration curve. Based on ORg we define the exogenously ordered concen-
tration curve. In contrast to the (classical) concentration curve, ordered relative sums
of objects according to the exogenous order form a curve which is still monotone in-
creasing but not necessarily concave. As a consequence the frequency polygon can
cross the diagonal from (0, 0) to (n, 1). Figure 1 illustrates a schematic exogenously
ordered concentration curve.
Concentration index. We use the schematic exogenously ordered concentration
curve in Figure 1 to motivate the definition of an appropriate concentration index.
The inequality in data with an exogenous order is illustrated by the area B, which
lies above the exogenously ordered concentration curve. The following relation holds:
The smaller the surface, the bigger the proportion among the “first few” statistical
units. In the extreme case that the whole balance applies on the first statistical unit,
one obtains Bmin = 0.5. Note that the uniform distribution does not represent one of
the two extreme cases anymore. The inequality among the first statistical units is now
minimal, if the whole balance applies to the last statistical unit; in this case we obtain
Bmax = n−0.5. For the uniform distribution we get qi = 1n for all i and the exogenous
ordered concentration curve is the diagonal with the corresponding area B = n
2
.
In general, B is computed by the formula
B =
n∑
i=1
iqi − 0.5.
Based on this area B, we introduce an index which captures the concentration in data
with an exogenous order:
OI :=
1
2B
=
1
2
∑n
i=1 iqi − 1
OI results in [ 1
2n−1 , 1]. Note that the uniform distribution with B =
n
2
results in
OI = 1
n
. For interpretation, the following statements can be proposed:
OI ∈ ( 1
n
, 1] concentration on anterior statistical units
OI ∈ [ 1
2n−1 ,
1
n
) concentration on posterior statistical units
OI = 1
n
no concentration, all statistical units have
the same proportion of the sum
In analogy to the classical concentration measures we define a normalized version as
well as the measures’ inverse. The normalized version is (OI∗ ∈ [0, 1]):
OI∗ :=
B − c
1− c with c =
1
2n− 1
And the measures’ inverse, as the “equivalent number of congenerous units”, is nOI =
1
OI
, with 1 ≤ nOI ≤ 2n− 1.
Note that now the interpretation of the measures’ inverse nOI is subject to the fol-
lowing restrictions. Here, the extreme cases occur if the whole balance applies to
“the first” or “the last” statistical unit (in sense of the exogenous order) resulting
in nOI ∈ {1; 2n − 1}. Consequently, the uniform distribution does not represent an
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extreme case anymore and can be interpreted as a “medium concentration of the first
statistical units” with the corresponding equivalent number of congenerous statistical
units being exactly equal to the true number of statistical units, nOI = n. Further-
more, it is possible that the equivalent number of congenerous units exceeds the actual
number of statistical units, i.e., nOI > n; if this occurs, the balance applies on the last
statistical units. In contrast we obtain nOI < n, if the balance applies on the first
statistical units.
Axiomatic of the concentration index OI. Literature discusses and defines a set
of characteristics required by concentration measures (see, e.g., Hannah and Kay, 1977;
Encaoua and Jacquemin, 1980; Piesch, 1975). The concentration index for exogenous
ordered data OI satisfies the following axioms (always with respect to the exogenous
order).
Independence: Unchanged concentration when proportionally transform-
ing the data.
Symmetry: Unchanged concentration when permuting the ranking of two
statistical units while simultaneously exchanging their value.
Continuity: Continuous concentration with respect to the exogenously
ordered relative sum of statistical units g.
Translations: Decreasing (increasing) concentration when reallocating a
value from an anterior statistical unit to a posterior statistical unit
(and vice versa).
Proportionality: Decreasing concentration of factor 1/c when replacing
each statistical unit by c equal sized units.
Extention: Unchanged concentration when augmenting the data with
new statistical units each with value zero.
Standardization: Transformation of the concentration index into a stan-
dardized version with values in [0, 1].
Appendix A.2 provides the formal proofs.
4 Transfer spendings in the German Bundesliga
In this section we illustrate the differences between classical approaches of concentra-
tion measurement and our proposed approach. For this purpose, we investigate the
inequality with respect to the variable transfer spendings among the soccer teams of
the German Bundesliga, which are ordered by their league rankings at the end of each
season. The data contains the amount of transfer spendings (in Euro), spent at the
start of each season, for the years 1992/1993 to 2009/2010. Classical measures of con-
centration could be used to analyze, if a general financial inequality can be observed
in the German Bundesliga or if some soccer teams are financially superior to others,
respectively. What is more, it is to be assumed that those teams that spend more
money for new players than other teams, could derive a sportive advantage from this
and thus could achieve better league ranks. Such a relationship can not be captured by
6
classical measures of concentration. Our proposed concentration measure for exoge-
nous ordered data—the league rankings of the teams—allows to interpret the observed
inequality with respect to the sportive success of the soccer teams.
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Figure 2: Concentration curves of transfer spendings in the German Bundesliga for the
seasons 1992/1993–2009/2010; the black curve reflects the highest concentration (season
1992/1993); the blue curve reflects the second-highest concentration (season 2003/2004).
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Figure 3: Exogenously ordered concentration curves of transfer spendings in the German
Bundesliga for the seasons 1992/1993–2009/2010 (black curve: season 1992/1993; blue curve:
season 2003/2004).
First, we show the conventional concentration curves corresponding to the transfer
spendings of the 18 considered seasons in Figure 2. It can be seen, that all seasons
exhibit a certain level of inequality, which is for some seasons more distinct than
for others. The highest concentration is observed for the season 1992/1993 and is
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represented by the black curve, which lies above all other curves. For example, the
three teams with the biggest amount of transfer spendings own a proportion of almost
80% of the league’s total spendings. This indicates, that the league was in general very
unbalanced in that season with respect to investments into new players. However, there
is no information about the sportive success of these three teams available.
For comparison, Figure 3 shows the corresponding exogenously ordered concentra-
tion curves. Again, the black curve on top represents the season 1992/1993. As teams
are now ordered by their league rankings, the curves contain more information. For
example, it can be seen that the top four teams own already a proportion of about
80% of the league’s total spendings. Hence, in this season the sportive success of the
teams seems to be strongly connected with the amount of money that has been spent
for new players at the start of the season. What is also remarkable is that in some
seasons, as for example in the season 2003/2004 (lower blue curve), the top team’s
proportion of the league’s total spendings is almost zero (here OR1 = 0.005). This
may be due to huge investments in the preceding seasons and results in an ordered
concentration curve that partly lies below the bisecting line.
Season H H? RB RB? OI OI?
1992/1993 0.244 0.200 0.225 0.180 0.143 0.118
1993/1994 0.090 0.037 0.091 0.038 0.074 0.047
1994/1995 0.083 0.029 0.090 0.036 0.062 0.035
1995/1996 0.088 0.034 0.096 0.043 0.069 0.041
1996/1997 0.097 0.044 0.106 0.053 0.083 0.056
1997/1998 0.145 0.095 0.142 0.091 0.104 0.078
1998/1999 0.099 0.046 0.099 0.046 0.074 0.047
1999/2000 0.115 0.063 0.124 0.072 0.065 0.037
2000/2001 0.137 0.086 0.129 0.078 0.079 0.051
2001/2002 0.120 0.068 0.112 0.059 0.099 0.072
2002/2003 0.149 0.099 0.146 0.095 0.065 0.037
2003/2004 0.170 0.121 0.165 0.115 0.083 0.056
2004/2005 0.145 0.094 0.128 0.077 0.090 0.064
2005/2006 0.089 0.035 0.097 0.044 0.072 0.045
2006/2007 0.115 0.063 0.122 0.070 0.071 0.044
2007/2008 0.154 0.104 0.124 0.072 0.111 0.085
2008/2009 0.101 0.048 0.101 0.048 0.076 0.050
2009/2010 0.143 0.092 0.125 0.073 0.094 0.067
Table 1: Herfindahl, Rosenbluth and ordered concentration index, together with their nor-
malized versions for transfer spendings in the German Bundesliga, for the seasons 1992/1993–
2009/2010.
Additionally, we present the corresponding conventional measures of concentration
as well as the novel exogenously ordered concentration index in Table 1, together with
their normalized versions. By construction, for all measures the concentration values
of the normalized versions are smaller than for the original measures. In the following
we focus on the original versions of the indices. Both Herfindahl and Rosenbluth index
yield concentrations between 0.08 and 0.25, which indicates a general inequality for
transfer spendings in the German Bundesliga. Though, more information is offered
by the ordered concentration index. No concentration on better or worse teams would
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be given, if all teams had the same proportion of the total sum of transfer spendings.
In this case, the ordered concentration index would yield OI = 1/18 = 0.056. The
results in Table 1 show that this limit is exceeded for each of the considered seasons.
Consequently, a concentration of the transfer spendings on better teams is observed,
and never on worse teams. This seems to confirm the supposition, that spending more
money for new players results in sportive success.
Season 1/H 1/RB 1/OI
1992/1993 4.09 4.44 6.99
1993/1994 11.09 10.98 13.54
1994/1995 12.06 11.14 16.06
1995/1996 11.38 10.45 14.56
1996/1997 10.33 9.46 12.02
1997/1998 6.90 7.06 9.62
1998/1999 10.07 10.14 13.55
1999/2000 8.67 8.08 15.45
2000/2001 7.30 7.73 12.74
2001/2002 8.35 8.96 10.10
2002/2003 6.70 6.87 15.50
2003/2004 5.88 6.08 12.00
2004/2005 6.91 7.80 11.07
2005/2006 11.30 10.33 13.91
2006/2007 8.66 8.19 14.04
2007/2008 6.50 8.07 9.00
2008/2009 9.91 9.92 13.10
2009/2010 7.02 8.02 10.68
Table 2: Equivalent number of equal sized units of Herfindahl and Rosenbluth index as
well as equivalent number of congenerous units of ordered concentration index for transfer
spendings in the German Bundesliga, for the seasons 1992/1993–2009/2010.
This becomes even more obvious, when considering the corresponding equivalent
numbers, see Table 2. The results of the equivalent numbers of equal sized units
of Herfindahl and Rosenbluth index represent adequately the general unbalance for
transfer spendings in the German Bundesliga, for the years 1992/1993–2009/2010.
They correspond to an effective quantity from minimum 4, to maximum 12 equally
active teams on the transfer market. In contrast, the equivalent number of congenerous
units, 1/OI, offers more information than just recognizing that the league is generally
unbalanced with respect to transfer spendings. As we obtain nOI < 18 for all seasons,
the balance strictly applies on better teams, with a minimum of 7 and a maximum
of 16 congenerous teams. Once again, the supposition that investing into new players
can increase the sportive success of soccer teams, at least for the German Bundesliga,
is confirmed by these results.
5 Conclusion
The present paper introduces a generalization of market concentration. Instead of
ordering statistical units (e.g., enterprises) according to their market share, the gener-
alization allows their ordering according to an exogenous variable. This now enables
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to see market concentration in relation to further aspects, e.g, number of employees or
a rating agency’s ranking. We define an appropriate concentration measure for data
with an exogenous order and show that this measure satisfies the common axioms for
classical concentration measures. The application example shows the proposed method
in terms of transfer spendings of German Bundesliga soccer teams—whose “obvious”
exogenous orders are their league rankings.
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A Appendix
A.1 Computational details
All computations and graphics have been done using the statistical software R 2.15.2
(R Development Core Team, 2012), and the SportsAnalytics package (Eugster, 2011). R
itself and all packages used are freely available under the terms of the General Public Li-
cense from the Comprehensive R Archive Network at http://CRAN.R-project.org/.
Data sets and source codes for replicating our analyses are available in the Sports-
Analytics package. Execute the analysis of the German Bundesliga via:
R> demo("concentration-bundesliga", package = "SportsAnalytics")
The source code file for a demo is accessible via:
R> edit(file = system.file("demo", "concentration-bundesliga.R",
+ package = "SportsAnalytics"))
A.2 Axiomatic properties of the concentration index OI
Independence of the measuring scale. Let x[1], . . . x[n] be exogenously ordered
realizations of a metric object X, with corresponding relative sums of objects qi =
x[i]
n∑
j=1
xj
, i = 1, . . . , n. If the data x[1], . . . , x[n] is proportionally transformed to x˜[i] =
ax[i], a > 0, i = 1, . . . , n, we obtain the new relative sums of objects:
q˜i =
x˜[i]
n∑
j=1
x˜j
=
ax[i]
n∑
j=1
axj
=
ax[i]
a
n∑
j=1
xj
=
x[i]
n∑
j=1
xj
= qi.
So it follows directly from the definition of OI that the data x[1], . . . , x[n] and x˜[1], . . . , x˜[n]
have exactly the same concentration. Consequently, X and aX, a > 0, have the same
concentration.
Symmetry. If one permutates the ranking of two statistical units i and j and simul-
taneously transfers their observations xi and xj, there will be no change in the vector
of sums of objects corresponding the ranking position q. It is trivial that the value of
OI remains also unchanged.
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Continuity. The following holds:
lim
q→q˜
OI(n; q) = lim
q→q˜
1
2
∑n
i=1 qi − 1
(∗)
=
1
2
∑n
i=1 limqi→q˜i
qi − 1
=
1
2
∑n
i=1 q˜i − 1
= OI(n; q˜),
where we used in (∗) that the limit of a vector is regarded componentwise, thus lim
q→q˜
=
( lim
q1→q˜1
, . . . , lim
qn→q˜n
).
Translations. For given vector of successive sums qT = (q1, . . . , qn) and two sta-
tistical units i and j with i < j, reallocation of an object sum d, 0 < d ≤ qi, from
the anterior unit i to the posterior unit j results in the new vector of sums of objects
q˜T := (q1, . . . qi−1, qi − d, qi+1, . . . , qj−1, qj + d, qj+1, . . . , qn) and we obtain:
n∑
k=1
kq˜k =
i−1∑
k=1
kqk + iqi − id +
j−1∑
k=i+1
kqk + jqj + jd +
n∑
k=j+1
kqk
=
n∑
i=1
kqk − id + jd
=
n∑
i=1
kqk + d(j − i)
(∗)
>
n∑
i=1
kqk,
where we used in (∗) that d(j − i) > 0 holds, as j > i. Consequently:
2
∑n
k=1 kq˜k > 2
∑n
i=1 kqk
=⇒ 2∑nk=1 kq˜k − 1 > 2∑ni=1 kqk − 1
=⇒ 1
2
∑n
k=1 kq˜k−1 <
1
2
∑n
i=1 kqk−1
=⇒ OI(n; q˜) < OI(n; q).
In this case the concentration decreases. Note that for conventional concentration
measures usually the additional conditions qi > qj and qi − h = qj with 0 < d < h2 are
claimed. This reflects a special case, which is also covered by the more general proof
given above.
In contrast, if one transfers instead an arbitrary value 0 < d ≤ qj from a posterior
unit j to an anterior unit i, one obtains q˜T := (q1, . . . qi−1, qi + d, qi+1, . . . , qj−1, qj −
d, qj+1, . . . , qn) and the corresponding proof remains valid analogously with turned
inequalities.
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Proportionality. For n ≥ 2 statistical units let the relative sums of objects be given
by qT = (q1, . . . , qn). Then the corresponding space over the ordered concentration
curve yields B =
∑n
i=1 iqi−0.5. If one replaces each unit i with corresponding propor-
tion qi by c equal sized units with proportions
qi
c
, one obtains the new relative vector
of sums of objects q˜ = (q˜1, . . . , q˜cn)
T = ( q1
c
, . . . , q1
c
. . . , qn
c
, . . . , qn
c
) with corresponding
space B˜ =
∑cn
i=1 iq˜i − 0.5. In the following we show that B˜ = cB is satisfied. We can
derive:
B˜ =
cn∑
i=1
iq˜i − 0.5
=
c∑
i=1
iq˜i +
2c∑
i=c+1
iq˜i + . . . +
cn∑
i=c(n−1)+1
iq˜i − 0.5
=
c∑
i=1
i
q1
c
+
2c∑
i=c+1
i
q2
c
+ . . . +
cn∑
i=c(n−1)+1
i
qn
c
− 0.5
=
q1
c
c∑
i=1
i +
q2
c
2c∑
i=c+1
i + . . . +
qn
c
cn∑
i=c(n−1)+1
i− 0.5
=
q1
c
c(c + 1)
2
+
q2
c
(
c · c +
c∑
i=1
i
)
+ . . . +
qn
c
(
c(n− 1) · c +
c∑
i=1
i
)
− 0.5
= q1
(c + 1)
2
+
q2
c
(
c · c + c(c + 1)
2
)
+ . . . +
qn
c
(
c(n− 1) · c + c(c + 1)
2
)
− 0.5
= q1
(c + 1)
2
+ q2
(
c +
c + 1
2
)
+ . . . + qn
(
(n− 1) · c + c + 1
2
)
− 0.5
= cq2 + 2cq3 + . . . + (n− 1)cqn + c
2
n∑
i=1
qi︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+0.5
n∑
i=1
qi︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
−0.5
= cq2 + 2cq3 + . . . + (n− 1)cqn + c
2
+ 0.5− 0.5
= cq2 + 2cq3 + . . . + (n− 1)cqn − c
2
+ c
= cq2 + 2cq3 + . . . + (n− 1)cqn − c
2
+ c
n∑
i=1
qi
= cq1 + 2cq2 + . . . + ncqn − c
2
= c
n∑
i=1
iqi − c
2
= cB
It follows:
OI(cn; q˜) =
1
2B˜
=
1
2cB
=
1
c
OI(n; q).
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Extension. If one augments a distribution qT = (q1, . . . , qn) by m new units, each
with an object sum equal to zero, one obtains the new vector of ordered relative sums
q˜ := (q1, . . . qn, 0, . . . , 0) of length n + m. Then the following holds:
OI(n + m; q˜) =
1
2
∑(n+m)
i=1 iqi − 1
=
1
2
(∑n
i=1 iqi +
∑n+m
i=n+1 iqi
)− 1
=
1
2
(∑n
i=1 iqi +
∑n+m
i=n+1 i · 0
)− 1
=
1
2
∑n
i=1 iqi − 1
= OI(n; q).
Thus, the concentration remains unchanged.
Standardization. With the standardization proposed in Section 3, OI can be trans-
formed into a version OI∗ with values in [0, 1].
With Bmax = n− 0.5 and Bmin = 0.5 we get:
max
q
OI =
1
2Bmin
=
1
2 · 0.5 = 1,
min
q
OI =
1
2Bmax
=
1
2(n− 0.5) =
1
2n− 1 ,
consequently OI ∈ [ 1
2n−1 , 1] holds. In the standardized version OI
∗ the lower interval
limit is adjusted by the numerator up to 0. The denominator normalizes OI by the
corresponding interval width, so that the new interval length is equal to one.
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